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Human values and welfare state support in Europe:  
An East-West divide? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study uses comparative data from the European Social Survey to investigate the influence of 
self-transcendence and conservation values on public support for the welfare state. The results 
firstly show that these value dimensions are strongly related to welfare state support in the 
majority of the countries investigated. The main contribution of this study however, is that it 
evidences striking differences between countries regarding which values drive welfare attitudes, 
and the strength of the association between values and attitudes. Moreover, we show that the 
between-country variation in value effects is systematically related to contextual factors. 
Self-transcendence values are found to be a strong predictor of welfare state support in countries 
with high levels of social expenditure. In the less generous welfare states of Eastern Europe, the 
effects of self-transcendence values are weaker or absent. In Eastern European countries, 
conservation rather than self-transcendence values drive attitudes to the welfare state. Outspoken 
cohort differences in value effects in Eastern European countries as well as persisting differences 
between East and West Germany confirm our interpretation that the particular Eastern 
European pattern can be ascribed to the unique experiences of ‘authoritarian egalitarianism’ 
under communism. 
 
 
 
Key words: welfare state support, basic human values, European Social Survey, multi-group 
SEM 
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Human values and welfare state support in Europe:  
An East-West divide? 
 
1. Introduction 
In this study, we investigate the value orientations of citizens that underlie perceptions of welfare 
state legitimacy and support for public welfare provision. More specifically, we assess the impact 
of two higher-order value types from the theory of basic human values (Schwartz 1992) - self-
transcendence and conservation - on preferences for government intervention in welfare areas 
such as pensions, sickness benefits and unemployment benefits. It is our purpose to answer three 
research questions: First, what are the effects of self-transcendence and conservation values on 
welfare state support? Second, is the influence of values cross-culturally robust, i.e. similar across 
European countries? Third, what are the contextual factors that can account for any discovered 
between-country differences in the value effects?  
 
The present study contributes to the current understanding of welfare state attitudes in several 
ways. The main contribution is that it compares the empirical relationships between value 
priorities and welfare state across countries. While it is already known from previous research 
that broad value dimensions influence citizens’ responses to the welfare state (see e.g. Feldman 
and Steenbergen 2001; Feldman and Zaller 1992; Lewin-Epstein et al. 2003), this study evidences 
that the impact of values varies greatly across national contexts. Second, our comparative 
approach makes it possible to move beyond purely individual-level relationships, and to identify 
the contextual (institutional) factors that moderate the relationship between human values and 
welfare state attitudes. Specifically, we show how in Eastern countries1 –i.e. countries that are 
characterized by a less extensive welfare state as well as a unique cultural and political experience 
under communism- radically different value priorities are underlying welfare support. This 
contextual focus allows us to contribute to the (still limited) literature on policy feedback effects, 
in which public opinion is not only conceived as appearing on the ‘input’ side of democratic 
processes, but also as an outcome of government arrangements and institutions (Mettler and Soss 
2004; Kumlin & Stadelmann-Steffen 2014). Third, current welfare attitudes literature has largely 
neglected Eastern European countries, with their unique experiences of the communist era as 
well as their recent transition to Western-style democracy. Whereas a few studies investigate the 
                                                
1 Throughout this article, we use the term Eastern European countries to refer to the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEE), and Western countries to denote Nordic, Continental, Anglo-Saxon and Southern European 
countries 
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demographic and socio-economic basis of support as well as cross-national differences in welfare 
attitudes in Eastern Europe (e.g., Lipsmeyer 2003; Svallfors 2010), this study uncovers the 
underlying structuring of welfare state attitudes in Eastern European countries in terms of value 
priorities. 
 
To answer our research questions, we analyse data from the European Social Survey round 4 
(ESS-4, 2008/2009). A multi-group structural equation modelling (MGSEM) approach is used to 
estimate the effects of basic human values on welfare state support across a wide range of 
European countries, thereby taking cross-national measurement equivalence into account. 
 
 
2 Theoretical framework, previous research and hypotheses 
2.1 The theory of basic human values  
Values are personal and abstract motivational goals that refer to preferable modes of conduct or 
end-states of existence, and which guide people’s attitudes and behaviour (Rokeach 1973; 
Schwartz 1992; 1994). Schwartz’ (1992) well-known theory of basic human values identifies a structure 
of ten value types which can be derived from universal requirements of human existence. The 
postulated value types have distinct motivational emphases (see Table 1) and can be classified 
into a circular continuum representing their dynamic relationships (see Figure 1). Four 
higher-order value types along two orthogonal dimensions can be distinguished: 
self-transcendence (the promotion of welfare for all) versus self-enhancement (the promotion of 
individual interests, success and power), and openness to change (readiness for change and 
independence of thought, action and feelings) versus conservation (traditions, order, obedience, 
and resistance to change).  
 
A distinct advantage that Schwartz’ theory has over other value models is that a theoretically well 
founded and elaborately tested measurement instrument is available. The same set and structure 
of values has been identified empirically in more than 100 human societies and cultures (Schwartz 
1994; Schwartz and Sagiv 1995), and the cross-national comparability of the indicators has been 
studied intensively (e.g. Davidov et al. 2008a). Although the value models of Inglehart (1977) and 
Schwartz for a large part capture the same broad value divides (Dobewall & Rudnev 2014), it has 
been shown that the Schwartz’ value measures possess better measurement quality than 
Inglehart’s materialism-post-materialism scale (Datler et al. 2013). Another argument for 
choosing the Schwartz’ value theory is that its indicators are formulated in a more abstract 
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manner compared to the political values used in previous research (Feldman and Steenbergen 
2001; Feldman and Zaller 1992; Lewin-Epstein et al. 2003). This measurement gives a better 
reflection of the theoretical distance between values and attitudes (such as welfare support), 
guarantees better discriminant validity and allows for a more stringent test of the values-attitudes 
nexus. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
2.2 The link between basic human values and welfare state support  
Basic human values are thus broad goals that serve as guiding principles in the various domains 
of life. As such, values should be distinguished from ideological stances and political choice. 
Values are broader and more fundamental than political ideology, and can instead be 
conceptualized as the foundation ideologies are derived from (Caprara 2006). Furthermore, value 
priorities underpin the process of attitude formation (Sagiv and Schwartz 1995; Davidov et al. 
2008b). Conceptually, attitudes should be clearly delineated from values. Attitudes are summary 
evaluations concerning specific objects or situations, and that predispose individuals to react to 
certain objects in a favourable or unfavourable manner (Ajzen 2001). This is in contrast to values, 
which refer to abstract, trans-situational criteria upon which such evaluations are based. The 
values-attitudes link operates through the following social-psychological mechanism: values will 
influence the attitude towards an object to the extent that the attitudinal object has relevant 
consequences for the attainment of the motivational goals associated with that value (Sagiv and 
Schwartz 2005; Davidov et al. 2008b).  
 
This contribution focuses on citizens’ evaluations of the welfare state. Previous research has 
shown that support for government intervention is a crucial component of individual welfare 
state attitudes (van Oorschot and Meuleman 2012). Support for government intervention is often 
conceived as capturing two dimensions, namely preferences with regard to the range (what tasks 
concerning what policy areas governments should take responsibility for) and the degree (how 
much governments should spend on certain social policies) of government intervention (Roller 
1995). Based on the general social-psychological mechanism describe above, concrete hypotheses 
regarding the relationships between human values and welfare state support can be derived. The 
point of departure is the following: If the motivational goals associated with a particular value are 
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promoted (or obstructed) by welfare state arrangements, that value will have a positive (or 
negative) impact on welfare state attitudes.  
 
The welfare state has quite direct consequences for the motivational emphases associated with 
two2 higher-order value dimensions,3 namely self-transcendence and conservation values. Self-
transcendence comprises the value types benevolence and universalism, which share a 
motivational emphasis on the disregard for selfish interests in favour of the equal treatment and 
welfare of all individuals (Schwartz 1992). Through its function of securing a basic modicum of 
welfare for all citizens, the welfare state obviously provides opportunities to realize the 
motivational goals of self-transcendence. Therefore, we anticipate a positive relationship between 
these values and welfare state support. 
Hypothesis 1: People who embrace self-transcendence values are expected to be more supportive of 
welfare state arrangements. 
 
Conservation values emphasize the preservation of social order, compliance with established 
rules and customs, and obedience to authority. Alternative possible connections between these 
motivational emphases and the welfare state can be conceived. First, conservative critique of the 
welfare state stipulates that welfare arrangements change traditional forms of social order, destroy 
local communities and crowd out informal care relationships (Etzioni 1995). As such, the welfare 
state is opposed to traditional social order, and conservation values could have a negative 
influence on support for government intervention:  
Hypothesis 2a: People who embrace conservation values are expected to be less supportive of 
welfare state arrangements. 
 
However, the welfare state is at the same time a stabilizing system of social stratification 
(Esping-Andersen 1990), and state-governed social provision can be seen as part of the social 
order. According to this argument, conservation values can also be attained through welfare state 
arrangements, and conservation is expected to have a positive effect on welfare state support. 
                                                
2 The two other higher-order dimensions, self-enhancement and openness to change, are not studied in this 
contribution, since they are theoretically less relevant, and because including all the dimensions simultaneously causes 
multicollinearity problems (see the methods section for a discussion). 
3 In this contribution, we analyze higher-order value dimensions, because previous studies (Davidov et al. 2008a) 
have shown that the measurement instrument included in the European Social Survey (the dataset we use) lacks 
discriminant validity to distinguish between individual value types. However, using higher-order value dimensions is 
also justified from a theoretical perspective. Davidov et al. (2008a) argue that partitioning the circular continuum into 
ten value types is arbitrary, and that greater or fewer fine-tuned divisions are also possible. 
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Hypothesis 2b: People who embrace conservation values are expected to be more supportive of 
welfare state arrangements. 
  
 
Although we are not aware of previous studies on the relationship between human values and 
welfare support, various studies have employed ideological dimensions that are related to the self-
transcendence dimension. Lewin-Epstein et al. (2003) report that endorsement of equality as a 
justice principle increases support for redistributive policies, while Feldman and Steenbergen 
(2001) find that egalitarianism aggravates support for social welfare spending. These findings are 
compatible with hypothesis 1.  
 
 
2.3 Bringing context in: values, welfare support and institutional design 
 
These social-psychological mechanisms linking human values to welfare support might perhaps 
play at a purely individual level, they obviously do not operate in a societal vacuum. Existing 
welfare state research evidences that individuals’ belief systems are crucially intertwined with 
contextual factors, such as the design of welfare institutions (e.g. Arts and Gelissen 2001; Mau 
2003; van Oorschot et al. 2008; Rothstein 1998; Svallfors 2007). The literature is plagued by 
considerable disagreement, however, on the causal direction of the relationship between public 
opinion and welfare design. A central argument in the (neo-)institutionalist literature, for 
example, is that welfare institutions affect citizens’ beliefs and preferences. In this literature, 
institutions are considered as more than just sets of rules according to which material resources 
are redistributed. Institutions also express normative views on what is a just and fair social order 
(Svallfors 2007; Rothstein 1998). As such, institutional arrangements can be considered as parts 
of a ‘moral economy’ that have formative effects on values and reciprocity norms among citizens 
(Svallfors 1996; Mau 2003). Titmuss’ classic study on blood donations (1971) exemplifies this 
argument, by illustrating how specific institutional designs – in casu a privatized market with 
monetary remuneration – can undermine altruistic motives to give blood. In similar vein, also 
theories on policy feedback stress that institutional arrangements have an impact on public 
opinion. The policy feedback mechanism implies that policies,, once enacted, create incentives 
and interests and therefore affect subjective experiences and normative orientations (Mettler and 
Soss 2004; Svallfors 2007; Kumlin & Stadelmann-Steffen 2014). 
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Others have argued that the causal relationship runs in the other direction, namely from 
normative beliefs and opinions to institutional design. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) seminal work on 
welfare regimes, for example, draws heavily on the idea that the institutional set-up of welfare 
states is influenced by and embedded in specific socio-political value systems (i.e. liberal, social-
democratic and conservative ideologies). Similarly, the idea of policy responsiveness (Brooks & 
Manza 2006) implies that public opinion forms a political context that exerts a conditioning 
effect on institutional reform. Most probably, both mechanisms operate simultaneously. Taken 
together, policy feedback and policy responsiveness mechanisms can explain the phenomena of 
‘path dependency’ (Pierson 1993) and ‘virtuous or vicious circles’ (Rothstein 1998: 135) that help 
us to understand the unique and relatively consistent historical trajectories of different 
institutional traditions across welfare states. 
 
This study has neither the possibility nor the ambition to solve the question of the causality 
between polices and public opinion. Rather than studying how institutional set-up is related to 
popularity of certain values or the support for the welfare state, it is our goal to investigate how 
cross-national variation in the link between values and welfare support coincides with 
institutional differences. In other words: Does the extent to which certain values underpin 
welfare support vary alongside institutional welfare contexts? Although our cross-sectional study 
cannot substantiate this empirically, we are convinced that –for this specific question at least- 
policy feedback theory provides the most appropriate interpretative framework. The feedback 
literature explicitly mentions the possibility of cross-level interactions –i.e. institutional contexts 
moderating the link between individual-level characteristics (Kumlin & Stadelmann-Steffen 2014: 
319-321). Also Sagiv and Schwartz (1995: 447) voice the idea that the extent to which values 
influence attitudes must be understood by taking into account the moderating influence of 
contextual factors. European welfare states differ considerably in their arrangements and 
respective outcomes, as well as in their historical cultural and political legacies. As such, they are 
bound to stress (or indirectly elicit) different motivational goals, which can have important 
consequences for the specific sets of values that underpin public support. The theoretical 
plausibility of the opposite argument –the strength of value-welfare support nexus explaining the 
design of welfare institutions- is far less strong. Our choice for this theoretical perspective does 
not imply that we deny that the fact that institutional development is to a certain extent 
endogenous to value systems and welfare support; what we do argue is that this endogeneity does 
not have far-reaching consequences for our specific research question.   
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In the remainder of this section, we identify contextual factors that moderate (and thus explain) 
differences between countries in the relationship between values and welfare state support.  
 
First, we expect cross-national differences in the link between self-transcendence values and 
attitudes towards governmental responsibility. In countries where welfare state institutions are 
more committed to social protection (that is, in more generous and higher spending welfare 
states) the emphasis on the motivational goals related to self-transcendence values is stronger. 
This argumentation leads to hypothesis 3: 
Hypothesis 3: The positive effect of self-transcendence values is expected to be stronger in countries 
with a generous welfare state.  
To be clear: This hypothesis does not state that welfare generosity affects the level of 
endorsement of self-transcendence values or the level of welfare state support, but instead refers 
to a cross-level interaction: generosity is expected to (positively) moderate the strength of the 
relationship between self-transcendence and welfare state support. This hypothesis implies that 
Eastern European countries, which generally spend less on social provision, should display a 
weaker relationship between self-transcendence values and welfare state attitudes compared to 
Western European countries.  
 
Second, we also expect differences between countries in the link between conservation values 
and attitudes towards governmental responsibility. In general, we expect a negative relationship 
between conservation and welfare state support (hypothesis 2a), although a positive relationship 
is also possible (hypothesis 2b). Due to the unique historical experiences under communism, we 
expect that the link between conservation and welfare state support might operate quite 
differently in Eastern European countries to the way it does in Western ones. In particular, we 
predict that past experiences of the combination of an extensive welfare state and authoritarian 
regime (what Offe [1991] calls ‘authoritarian egalitarianism’) will produce a stronger positive 
relationship between conservation values and welfare state support in Eastern Europe. 
Hypothesis 4: In Eastern Europe, a stronger positive effect of conservation values on welfare 
support is expected.  
Even though the Eastern Bloc collapsed two decades ago, and despite the fact that Eastern 
European countries have gone through a ‘Westernization’ process, they remain crucially 
influenced by their communist legacy in terms of its social and authoritarian features (Offe and 
Fuchs 2007: 1). Adaptation to new institutional conditions is a slow process in which cohort 
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replacement plays a key role (Svallfors 2010). After all, political preferences are relatively stable 
orientations that are acquired during the formative years of childhood and adolescence (although 
they can be affected and altered by “transactions with the political environment throughout 
adulthood” as well [Niemi and Jennings 1991: 970; see also Kumlin 2006: 92]). Accordingly, we 
argue that experiences of the former communist system in Eastern European countries can still 
have consequences for the value underpinnings of contemporary welfare state support, especially 
among older cohorts.  
 
3. Data and methods 
3.1 Dataset 
In order to test our hypotheses empirically, we use data from the European Social Survey, Round 
4 (ESS-4 2008/2009, data release 4; see http://ess.nsd.uib.no). Survey respondents for the ESS-4 
were selected by means of strict probability samples of the resident populations aged 15 years and 
above.  
 
Data from the ESS-4 is available for 29 countries. In this study, we focus exclusively on the EU 
countries, Norway and Switzerland (which leads to the exclusion of Croatia, Israel, Russia, 
Turkey and Ukraine).4 Three other countries (Hungary, Romania and Slovakia) were also omitted 
due to multicollinearity problems in the human values measurements (see below). The remaining 
21 countries (with their country code and effective sample size) are: Belgium (BE – 1760), 
Bulgaria (BG – 2230), Switzerland (CH – 1819), Cyprus (CY – 1215), The Czech Republic (CZ – 
2017), Germany (DE – 2751), Denmark (DK – 1606), Estonia (EE – 1661), Spain (ES – 2576), 
Finland (FI – 2193), France (FR – 2071), The United Kingdom (UK – 2350), Greece (GR – 
2072), Ireland (IE – 1764), Latvia (LV – 1980), The Netherlands (NL – 1778), Norway (NO – 
1548), Poland (PL – 1616), Portugal (PT – 2367), Sweden (SE – 1827) and Slovenia (SI – 1284).  
 
3.2 Dependent variable: welfare state support  
The ESS-4 data includes six items gauging citizens’ preferences regarding the role of government 
in a number of welfare areas (see Table 2 for the exact wording of questions). This measurement 
instrument thus refers to the range of government intervention rather than the degree of 
                                                
4 Norway and Switzerland are not part of the EU, but but are part of European economic space (members of the 
European Free Trade Organization). We focus on this set of countries for various reasons. First, welfare states of 
countries that do not belong to this group are quite different both in structure and in size. As a result, respondents 
from these countries are likely to interpret the ESS items differently, which troubles cross-country comparability of 
the measurements. Furthermore, the availability of contextual indicators for these countries is very limited. 
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government spending (Roller 1995). The areas referred to include the core domains of the 
welfare state (social protection for the sick, elderly and unemployed), as well as family-related 
policies (childcare, paid leave to take care of family) and the labour market (providing jobs for 
everyone). Exploratory analyses (results not given here) showed that the separate items have very 
similar relationships to human values, and thus support the choice of constructing a scale rather 
than analysing domain-specific indicators. 
 
Previous studies have predominantly operationalized general support for government 
intervention by constructing additive composite indices (see for example Svallfors 1997; 
Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). By contrast, a multi-group confirmatory factor analysis 
(MGCFA; Jöreskog 1971) approach is taken in this study. This allows us to test for metric 
equivalence (i.e. equality of factor loadings), which is a prerequisite for making meaningful 
comparisons of relationships (in this case between human values and support for government 
intervention) across countries (Davidov et al. 2014). Concretely, measurement quality and 
comparability was tested by fitting several nested MGCFA models with 21 groups (one group for 
every country) with the six indicators loading on one latent construct (see Table 3 for a summary 
of these models). In each model, three error covariances were tolerated.5 The first model (Model 
1) is a baseline model without cross-group constraints on the factor loadings (i.e., configural 
equivalence). This model gives an acceptable approximation of the data (CFI = 0.985; RMSEA = 
0.074 – see Table 2). Standardized factor loadings are quite strong (mostly > 0.50), indicating that 
the ESS items are sufficiently valid and reliable indicators of the latent construct. In Model 2, all 
factor loadings were set as equal across groups. These additional constraints led to a slight 
deterioration of the global model fit. Inspection of the modification indices showed that a limited 
number of equality constraints are responsible for the deterioration. In Model 3, 11 factor 
loadings constraints with high modification indices were left out,6 thereby improving model fit 
again (CFI = 0.977; RMSEA = 0.069). More importantly, according to the guidelines put forward 
by Cheung and Rensvold (2002), CFI and RMSEA for this model do not indicate a substantially 
worse fit compared to the configural model (ΔCFI = -0.008; ΔRMSEA = -0.005). This suggests 
that the model no longer contains sizeable cross-sample differences in factor loadings. Since 
                                                
5 The error covariances set free are: D15 with D18; D16 with D17; and D19 with D20. These error covariances are 
theoretically justified. D15 and D18 both refer to unemployment. D19 and D20 deal with family-related policies. 
D16 and D17 mention government support for target groups that are widely regarded as highly deserving, namely 
the elderly and the sick (van Oorschot 2006). 
6 The following factor loadings had to be set free: D16 for BG; D17 for BG, CH, CY, DE and LV; D18 for BE, FR 
and LV; and D19 for DE and PT. 
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factor loadings are at least equal for two items, partial metric equivalence is found, which means 
that valid comparisons of effect parameters are possible (Byrne et al. 1989). 
 
[TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.3 Basic human values 
The ESS-4 includes 21 items to measure the ten human value types postulated by Schwartz 
(1992). This battery of questions is based on the original 40-item Portrait Value Questionnaire 
(PVQ: see for example Schwartz et al. 2001). The items describe a gender-matched fictitious 
person and the respondent is asked to decide on a scale from 1 (very much like me) to 6 (not like 
me at all) to what extent this person is, or is not, like him or her. Two questions are included to 
measure each value, except for universalism, which is measured using three items due to its broad 
content.  
 
The measurement characteristics of the ESS version of the human values scale have been dealt 
with extensively in previous studies (Davidov et al. 2008a; Knoppen and Saris 2009). These 
studies show that due to the relatively small number of items per value type and the rather broad 
content of the items, the ESS instrument lacks the discriminant validity to make a clear-cut 
distinction between the ten value types. Instead, all indicators tend to load on the higher-order 
dimensions, and multicollinearity problems arise (see also Davidov et al. 2008b). Therefore, we 
decided to include the higher-order dimensions of conservation and self-transcendence in the 
analysis. This decision is also justified for theoretical reasons. Davidov et al. (2008a) argue that 
the division into ten distinct value types is an arbitrary convenience, and that broader or more 
finely-tuned value types could equally be constructed.7  
 
In a similar way as for the ‘support for government intervention’ scale, we tested measurement 
quality and comparability by means of MGCFA (see Table 3). The MGCFA models contain two 
latent constructs (namely, the higher-order dimensions conservation and self-transcendence) that 
are measured by means of ten indicators (five items per construct). The question wordings for 
the value items used in this study can be found in Table 2. One of the original indicators of 
                                                
7 Yet, even when using higher-order dimensions instead of individual value types, multicollinearity problems arise. 
Three Eastern European countries (Hungary, Slovakia and Romania) had to be dropped because of a very strong 
correlation (> 0.80) between the value dimensions of conservation and self-transcendence. Also for the other 
Eastern European countries, correlations between self-transcendence and conservation are remarkably stronger than 
for the rest of Europe. A possible explanation could be found in these countries’ “political majority culture of 
‘authoritarian egalitarianism’” (Offe 1991). 
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conservation explicitly referring to a strong government (“It is important to him that the government 
ensures his safety against all threats. He wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens”.) was taken 
out, because it is conceptually too close to the dependent variable used in this study. A 
configurally equivalent model (Model 1, without equality constraints on the loadings) shows a 
reasonable fit (CFI = 0.925; RMSEA = 0.065). Adding between-country constraints on the factor 
loadings (Model 2) deteriorates the fit. However, we identified a limited number of constrained 
factor loadings responsible for the additional misfit.8 Removing these untenable constraints leads 
to a well-fitting model implying partial metric equivalence, thus making the comparison of effect 
parameters possible. 
 
3.4 Contextual indicators 
According to our argument, the impact of self-transcendence values on welfare state support will 
be contingent on the generosity of the welfare state. One possible indicator of welfare state 
generosity is social expenditure. However, the accuracy of this indicator has been criticized, as it 
may not adequately represent a country’s commitment to social protection and the degree of 
benefit generosity. The generosity of benefit provision entails several aspects - such as coverage 
rates, benefit levels and duration periods - that amount to a general indication of welfare state 
generosity. These figures would constitute a more adequate measurement of a country’s 
commitment to social protection (Scruggs 2006), but are only available for a limited number of 
countries (mainly in the OECD area). This makes it necessary to use the social spending figures 
in order to analyse all 21 countries. Concretely, we make use of the figures for total social 
expenditure expressed as a percentage of GDP.9 
 
 
4. Results 
In the analysis, we test the general hypotheses concerning the relationship between each 
higher-order value type and attitudes towards government intervention (hypotheses 1 and 2; see 
section 4.1) as well as the ones concerning the moderating role of contextual factors (hypotheses 
3 and 4; see section 4.2). With regard to our general hypotheses, we expect a positive effect from 
self-transcendence and have mixed expectations regarding the impact of conservation values. 
Moreover, we expect stronger effects from self-transcendence values in the larger and 
higher-spending Western European welfare states. With regard to the effects from conservation 
                                                
8 The factor loadings set free are: G9 on Conservation in BG; G18 on Self-transcendence and G20 on Conservation 
in DK; and G7, G9 and G16 on Conservation in PT.  
9 This figure was retrieved from the Eurostat statistics database (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/). 
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values, we expect positive effects on welfare state attitudes in the former authoritarian Eastern 
European states, especially among older cohorts with greater experience of the former 
communist regimes. Finally, section 4.3 presents additional analyses that go deeper in the 
question what is the driving factor between the East-West divide.  
 
4.1 Effects of self-transcendence and conservation values on welfare state support 
As a first step, we estimate a multi-group structural equation model (MGSEM), in which support 
for government intervention is explained by means of the two higher-order value dimensions.10 
The model contains 21 groups (one for each country) and takes into account the deviations from 
full metric invariance discussed in section 3. Fit indices for this model indicate that it gives an 
appropriate description of the data. In Table 4, the estimated effects of self-transcendence and 
conservation values are presented as unstandardized coefficients. 11  The results for self-
transcendence values are quite consistent: The anticipated positive effect is found for 16 out of 
the 21 countries, while a negative effect is found for only one country. Thus, in the majority of 
countries, people who embrace self-transcendence values are more likely to support government 
intervention. For 10 countries, the self-transcendence effect is quite strong (standardized 
parameter > 0.25), suggesting that self-transcendence is, in certain contexts at least, an important 
predictor of welfare state support. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As expected, results for the higher-order value type, conservation, are more mixed. The effect is 
significant for only 12 countries, with a positive effect for 8 countries and a negative one for 4 
countries. Thus, for most countries where the estimates are significant, the effects of 
conservation values are positive. In these countries, people who embrace conservation values are 
more supportive of government intervention. As such, the findings largely contradict the 
conservative critique hypothesis (hypothesis 2a), and render (yet limited) support for hypothesis 
2b. 
 
                                                
10 Because we are interested in the overall strength of the value-attitudes link rather than net effects, the models 
presented here do not include control variables. In an additional model, we tested the robustness of our results by 
introducing several individual-level control variables: age, gender, number of years full-time education completed, 
and social class (based on the EGP scheme). We decided not to control for ideological variables, since value theory 
stipulates that basic human values are causally antecedent to ideology (Caprara et al. 2006). Although in some 
instances the effects change substantially, adding controls does not change the general pattern and interpretations of 
the results. A detailed account of this additional model with controls can be found in the online Appendix. 
11 Unstandardized effects are more suitable for between-country comparison than standardized ones, since the 
latter coefficients also require equality of factor variances (which was not tested here). 
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We identify considerable differences between countries, not only with regard to significance, but 
also in the size of effects. At first sight, the strongest effects for self-transcendence seem to be 
found in Western European countries, while the Eastern European countries show non-existent 
or even negative (Poland) effects. Slovenia is a notable exception to this pattern, as a strong 
positive effect is found here.12 Conservation values have positive effects on welfare state support 
predominantly in Eastern European countries, but also in Germany and to a lesser extent in 
Spain. There are various possible explanations for the quite strong positive effect in Germany. 
The German welfare state is known for its conservative design in terms of preserving social 
order, and thus might therefore be more strongly backed by conservation values. Yet, the 
strongly positive effect might also be the result of the communist history of East Germany, 
which merits separate analyses for East and West Germany in this regard (see section 4.3). 
Negative effects of the conservation value are found in Portugal, Denmark, Switzerland and 
Finland. 
 
4.2 The moderating effect of context 
The considerable cross-national differences in value effects elicit the question of whether these 
differences can be explained by contextual factors. In this section, we perform a more thorough 
test of the moderating effect of contextual factors, notably social expenditure and a communist 
past (hypotheses 3 and 4).  
 
Figure 2 analyses the relationship between the effects of self-transcendence values (y-axis) and 
social spending as a percentage of GDP (x-axis). The effects of self-transcendence values seem to 
increase with social spending. Despite the small number of observations (21 countries), the 
correlation coefficient is statistically significant (corr. = 0.58; p = 0.0056).13 This finding is in line 
with the theoretical mechanisms detailed above. In countries implementing a generous social 
policy, the welfare state offers stronger opportunities to realize the motivational goals associated 
with self-transcendence values. Consequently, the impact of these values on welfare state support 
is greater. 
 
                                                
12 A possible explanation of the exceptional position of Slovenia might stem from the fact that the Slovenian 
experience is rather different to that of the Eastern Bloc. For instance, the Tito-Stalin split in 1948 was followed by 
comparatively extensive individual and economic freedoms. In the 1960s, after economic reforms and 
decentralization in Yugoslavia, Slovenia was already approaching a market economy. Later, Slovenia was the first 
post-communist transition country meeting the Maastricht criteria and joining the European Monetary Union.  
13 We also calculated the partial correlation between the effect of self-transcendence and social expenditure, 
controlling for GDP per capita. This partial correlation equals 0.40 (p-value = 0.0841), and thus remains 
substantively relevant as well as statistically significant at the .10 level. 
16 
 
 
However, some qualification is needed. If we examine the relationship between social spending 
and the effect of values within the Eastern and Western clusters separately, no positive 
relationship is found. The size of the effect of self-transcendence values seems to run along the 
East-West divide, rather than being driven by social spending. Potentially, the absence of a clear 
relationship within the Eastern and Western clusters can be explained by social spending as a 
percentage of GDP being an imperfect indicator of welfare generosity. A more substantive 
explanation could be that the differences in the self-transcendence effect result from divergent 
historical experiences, and that the comparably weak effects are due to the communist legacy. 
Indeed, if the communist history is the main driver of these results, and the Eastern European 
public under communism perceived the state as failing in promoting self-transcendence values, 
this pattern is what one would expect. 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Turning to the impact of conservation values on welfare state attitudes, the contextual factor that 
we believe moderates this relationship is a qualitative one: we expect experiences from living 
under the ‘egalitarian authoritarianism’ (Offe 1991) of communist regimes to result in a more 
positive impact from conservation values. The observed effect sizes confirm this pattern. For the 
Eastern European countries, the average effect size equals 0.66, while the average effect size for 
Western countries (including Continental, Nordic and Southern countries) is 0.03. This difference 
is statistically strongly significant (t-value = 4.41; p-value = 0.0003), in spite of the small number 
of observations. Figure 3 gives a graphical representation of the findings, and shows that greater 
and positive effects from conservation are consistently found in the Eastern European countries. 
However, three countries do not follow the observed pattern. In Slovenia, a near-zero effect is 
found, while Germany and Cyprus show positive effects that are similar to the ones found in 
Eastern Europe.  
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.3 Two additional tests for the influence of communist history 
It is our interpretation that the differences in the effects of conservation between Eastern and 
Western European countries are due to the communist legacy of authoritarian egalitarianism. 
However, the East-West divide is a catch-all variable that also captures a great many institutional 
and economic differences. To strengthen our interpretation, we carry out two additional 
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empirical tests. Our first additional test uses the specific case of Germany (which has already 
attracted attention due to an exceptionally strong positive conservation effect) to disentangle 
institutional, economic and historical factors. East (DEE) and West Germany (DEW) have 
followed clearly different historical paths, with East Germany belonging to the Communist Bloc 
until the unification of 1990. However, since then East and West Germany have for the most 
part shared their institutional setup and economic situation as part of one federal state 
(notwithstanding regional differences). If the legacy of communism is a crucial factor determining 
the impact of conservation values, the effect in East Germany should follow the pattern of 
Eastern European countries, notwithstanding two decades of German unification. The results 
(shown in Figure 3) confirm this hypothesis. If we estimate the effects for East and West 
Germany separately (using a MGSEM with 22 groups for 20 countries and the ‘two Germanys’), 
a clear divergence between East and West Germany is found. Conservation values have a strong 
positive effect on attitudes towards governmental responsibility in East Germany (0.69), which is 
completely in accordance with the post-communist pattern. The conservation effect in West 
Germany (0.18) is in line with the pattern in Western Europe. These findings render clear 
support for our assumption that a common denominator in Eastern Europe, namely experiences 
from communism, result in fundamental differences with regard to the influence of conservation 
values.  
 
Our second test concerns cohort differences. If a communist legacy is the explanation for the 
strongly positive conservation effects in Eastern Europe, we expect to see strong cohort 
differences in these countries. Hence, the positive impact of conservation values should be more 
apparent among older cohorts who experienced the former system. Younger people in Eastern 
European countries, especially those socialized after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, should 
show patterns more similar to Western Europeans in this regard. Concurrently, we do not expect 
such cohort differences in Western Europe. To test these expectations, we estimated the effect of 
conservation values on welfare support for four age cohorts (15 to 32 years, 33 to 43 years, 44 to 
63 years, and 64 years and above) in Eastern and Western European countries separately. Figure 
4 displays this conservation effect (Y-axis) for each age cohort within the two regions (East vs. 
West). 
 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
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In Western European countries, cohort differences in the effects of conservation values are quite 
small and statistically insignificant (the 95% confidence intervals overlap). For the four cohorts, 
the effect of conservation is relatively close to zero. By contrast, in Eastern European countries 
cohort differences in the values-attitudes link are considerably larger. The effect of conservation 
values is by far the strongest (1.35) in the oldest cohort of respondents, aged 64 or above. The 
effects for the two cohorts aged between 15 and 32, 33 and 43, and between 44 and 63, are 
significantly weaker (0.48, 0.65 and 0.60 respectively) and are very similar to the conservation 
effects found in Western Europe. In fact, for the cohorts aged between 33 and 43, and between 
44 and 63, no significant East-West difference can be found regarding the impact of conservation 
values. Given our socialization argument, it is surprising that no clear-cut East-West differences 
are found for those aged between 44 and 63, who were roughly between 25 and 44 years old (and 
thus past their formative years) during the collapse of the Communist Bloc. Nevertheless, the 
remarkable position of the oldest cohort in the East suggests that the unique experiences from 
being socialized in the former communist states have important consequences for the extent to 
which people perceive their values to be attained through welfare state arrangements.  
 
 
5. Conclusions and discussion 
In this study, we have shown that attitudes to the welfare state in Europe are strongly embedded 
in citizens’ value orientations. Self-transcendence values significantly influence welfare state 
support in the majority of the European countries under study, in the sense that people who 
embrace self-transcendence values in these countries display stronger support. Findings for 
conservation values are more mixed, with some countries showing a positive influence, while in 
others, negative or near-zero effects are found.  
 
However, which specific value dimensions drive public welfare state support turns out to vary 
crucially across national contexts. In line with our theoretical expectations, the strongest positive 
effects of self-transcendence are found in welfare states with high levels of social expenditure. In 
the less generous welfare states of Eastern Europe, the positive impact of self-transcendence is 
considerably weaker or even non-existent. However, close inspections of the scatter plot raise 
doubts about whether the link between self-transcendence and welfare state support is truly 
moderated by social expenditure. After all, the relationship between social spending and the 
effect of self-transcendence values does not appear separately within the clusters of Western and 
Eastern European countries. This is possibly a result of the inadequacy of our indicator. In light 
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of this, our results with regard to the influence of spending should be interpreted with a fair 
degree of caution. Future research should, especially in the presence of new data, devote efforts 
to investigate this further.  
 
In Eastern European countries, conservation rather than self-transcendence values seem to be 
the central values that people draw on when forming their opinions concerning welfare state 
arrangements. We argue that this particular pattern in Eastern Europe might be due to the unique 
historical experience of authoritarian egalitarianism under communism. Two additional analyses 
support this interpretation. First, the conservation effect in West Germany is very similar to the 
Western European countries, while East Germany displays a pattern that is characteristic of 
Eastern European countries. Two decades of shared institutional settings in East Germany have 
apparently not erased the persistent social and political culture of the past. Second, clear cohort 
differences in the effect of conservation are found in Eastern Europe: positive effects of 
conservation values are considerably stronger among the older cohorts. By contrast, in Western 
Europe no substantial cohort effects are present. It appears as though older people in Eastern 
Europe are responding to a system that is a thing of the past, and that these responses will 
probably disappear gradually as younger cohorts replace the older ones.  
 
These findings corroborate the argument put forth by Svallfors (2010), namely that expectations 
regarding the role of government change slowly, for instance in terms of what motivational goals 
(i.e., values) the public demands that governments pursue. When it comes to the formation of 
attitudes and their underlying structuring, it seems as though historical experiences can be as 
influential as present-day circumstances. From a policy feedback perspective, it is particularly 
interesting that expectations and preferences seem to linger and have great consequences for 
attitudes towards an entirely new institutional reality. This also brings to the fore new questions 
about the future orientation and calibration of welfare state institutions in Eastern European 
countries. We have shown that while previous research provides evidence that attitudes in 
Eastern and Western Europe are converging, there are still fundamental differences in the 
structuring of these attitudes in terms of their underlying values. To assess whether this has 
important consequences for the prospects of welfare state development in Eastern Europe is a 
question beyond the scope of this study, but an important task for future research.  
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Table 1. Basic human values and motivational emphasis. 
 
Value Motivational emphasis 
POWER Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources.  
ACHIEVEMENT  Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards.  
HEDONISM Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself.  
STIMULATION Excitement, novelty and challenge in life.  
SELF-DIRECTION  Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, and exploring.  
UNIVERSALISM  Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature.  
BENEVOLENCE Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact.  
TRADITION Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self.  
CONFORMITY  Restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms.  
SECURITY  Safety, harmony and stability of society, relationships and self.  
From Schwartz et al. (2001). 
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Table 2. Question wording for the ESS items. 
Concept Item # Question wording Answer scale 
    
For each of the tasks I read out, please tell me on a score of 0-
10 how much responsibility you think governments should 
have…   
W
el
fa
re
 s
ta
te
 s
up
po
rt
 D15 …ensure a job for everyone who wants one? 
0 (should not be 
the government’s 
responsibility at all) 
- 10 (should be 
entirely the 
government’s 
responsibility) 
D16 …ensure adequate health care for the sick? 
D17 …ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old? 
D18 …ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed? 
D19 …ensure sufficient childcare services for working parents? 
D20 …provide paid leave from work for people who temporarily have to care for sick family members? 
Se
lf-
tr
an
sc
en
de
nc
e 
(S
T
) G3 
He thinks it is important that every person in the world be 
treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal 
opportunities in life. 
1 (not like me at 
all) - 6 (very much 
like me) 
G8 
It is important to him to listen to people who are different 
from him. Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to 
understand them.  
G12 It is very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for their well-being.  
G18 It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to people close to him. 
G19 He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him.  
C
on
se
rv
at
io
n 
(C
O
) 
G5 It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety.  
G7 
He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks 
people should follow rules at all times, even when no one is 
watching.  
G9 It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw attention to himself.  
G16 It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.  
G20 Tradition is important to him. He tries to follow the customs handed down by his religion or his family. 
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Table 3. Results for the MGCFA measurement equivalence tests. 
 Chi² Df RMSEA CFI ΔRMSEA ΔCFI 
Welfare state support       
M1: Baseline - configural equivalence 1456.5 126 0.074 0.985 - - - - 
M2: Metric equivalence 2694.2 226 0.075 0.972 0.001 -0.013 
M3: Partial metric equivalence 2177.2 215 0.069 0.977 -0.005 -0.008 
Basic Human Values       
M1: Baseline - configural equivalence 6467.8 714 0.065 0.925 - - - - 
M2: Metric equivalence 7579.0 874 0.064 0.912 -0.001 -0.013 
M3: Partial metric equivalence 7169.4 868 0.062 0.917 -0.003 -0.008 
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Table 4. Estimated effects (standardized parameters in parentheses) of higher-order value dimensions on 
welfare state support. 
 
Conservation  Self-transcendence 
 Par.Est (Std.Par.)   Par.Est (Std.Par.) 
PL 1.200 (0.44)  SI 1.345 (0.45) 
CZ 0.862 (0.31)  GR 1.039 (0.38) 
EE 0.706 (0.27)  DK 0.924 (0.40) 
BG 0.660 (0.25)  PT 0.884 (0.39) 
LV 0.617 (0.24)  NO 0.854 (0.36) 
CY 0.596 (0.21)  FI 0.845 (0.37) 
DE 0.464 (0.20)  ES 0.832 (0.30) 
ES 0.243 (0.10)  IE 0.784 (0.29) 
BE 0.057 (0.02)  FR 0.708 (0.28) 
UK 0.045 (0.03)  SE 0.692 (0.27) 
NL 0.027 (0.02)  BE 0.641 (0.24) 
SE 0.023 (0.01)  UK 0.608 (0.24) 
FR 0.002 (0.00)  CY 0.541 (0.18) 
GR -0.001 (0.00)  NL 0.491 (0.24) 
NO -0.011 (-0.01)  CH 0.422 (0.11) 
SI -0.063 (-0.03)  DE 0.260 (0.08) 
FI -0.136 (-0.08)  BG 0.030 (0.01) 
IE -0.162 (-0.08)  CZ -0.056 (-0.02) 
CH -0.210 (-0.09)  LV -0.162 (-0.06) 
DK -0.221 (-0.14)  EE -0.303 (-0.10) 
PT -0.265 (-0.12)  PL -0.787 (-0.26) 
Fit indices of the MGCFA model: Chi² = 13409.9  Df = 2300  CFI = 0.934  RMSEA = 0.050 
Note: Statistically significant parameters (α = 0.05) are printed in bold 
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Figure 1. Circular continuum representing basic human values and higher-order value types. 
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Figure 2. Effects sizes for self-transcendence values on welfare state support and total social expenditure. 
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Figure 3. Unstandardized effects of conservation values on welfare state support (y-axis) – Western and 
Eastern European countries compared 
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Figure 4. Unstandardized effects of conservation values on welfare state support across cohorts in 
Western and Eastern European countries (with 95% confidence intervals).  
 
 
 
 
 
